當前比較流行也比較有效率的挖掘的漏洞的方法是Fuzzing，當然這也需要花點時間去寫Fuzzing程序。然而不是每個東西都有必要去寫Fuzzing程序,也不是每個東西都可以去Fuzzing的，所以也還是要繼續修煉我們的二進制安全流派內功—“肉眼挖洞神功”。
安全漏洞在源代碼層面和匯編代碼層面會有不同的表現，想要進階升級的話，必須清晰的了解每種安全漏洞類型在源代碼層面和匯編代碼層面都是張什么樣的。有些安全漏洞在源代碼層面容易發現它，有些安全漏洞則在匯編代碼層面比較容易發現它。不管是源代碼層面還是匯編代碼層面，普通人看代碼的時候即使看到有安全漏洞的那些代碼的時候，往往是“只見代碼，不見漏洞”。修煉“肉眼挖洞神功”的目標是看到那些疑似有問題的代碼時候能夠警覺，能夠識別，并快速判定是否可形成安全漏洞。
早些時候給我們翰海源的小伙伴們講過《深入安全漏洞-Root Cause of Vulnerabilities》和《決戰匯編代碼》，希望小伙伴們能夠掌握安全漏洞的本質原因以及練就“肉眼挖洞神功”。今天把里面的部分例子跟大伙一起分享下。
*unix 下的 link attack,有意識到嗎？
#!c
if(access("file",W_OK)!=0){
exit(1);
}
fd = open("file",O_WRONLY);
write(fd,buffer,sizeof(buffer));
發生在真實的 openssh 3.1 ，有漏洞嗎？
#!c
u_int nresp;
...
nresp = packet_get_int();
if(nresp){
response = xmalloc(nresp * sizeof(char*));
for(i=0; i<nresp; i++)
response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
}
packet_check_eom();
注意整形符號，能被繞過嗎？
#!c
int read_user_data(int sockfd)
{
int length, sockfd, n;
char buffer[1024];
length = get_user_length(sockfd);
if(length > 1024){
error("illegal input, not enough room in buffer\n");
return 1;
}
if(read(sockfd, buffer, length) < 0){ error("read: %m");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
整形截斷問題？
#!c
void assume_privs(unsigned short uid) {
seteuid(uid);
setuid(uid);
}
int become_user(int uid)
{
if (uid == 0)
die("root isnt allowed");
assume_privs(uid);
}
(CVE-2014-1266)多個goto fail造成重大安全隱患。
#!c
static OSStatus
SSLVerifySignedServerKeyExchange(SSLContext *ctx, bool isRsa, SSLBuffer signedParams,
uint8_t *signature, UInt16 signatureLen)
{
...
if ((err = ReadyHash(&SSLHashSHA1, &hashCtx)) != 0)
goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &clientRandom)) != 0)
goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
goto fail;
goto fail; <---- *** DANGER ***
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
goto fail;
err = sslRawVerify(ctx,
ctx->peerPubKey,
dataToSign, /* plaintext */
dataToSignLen, /* plaintext length */
signature,
signatureLen);
...
fail:
SSLFreeBuffer(&signedHashes);
SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx);
return err;
}
沖擊波蠕蟲只因為一個緩沖區溢出。
#!c
HRESULT GetMachineName (WCHAR * pwszPath) {
The WCHAR wszMachineName [N + 1]);
...
LPWSTR pwszServerName = wszMachineName;
while (* pwszPath! = L '\\')
* PwszServerName + + = * pwszPath + +;
...
}
#!c
unsigned short read_length(int sockfd)
{
unsigned short len;
if(full_read(sockfd, (void *)&len, 2) != 2)
die("could not read length!\n");
return ntohs(len);
}
int read_packet(int sockfd)
{
struct header hdr;
short length;
char *buffer;
length = read_length(sockfd);
if(length > 1024){
error("read_packet: length too large: %d\n", length);
return 1;
}
buffer = (char *)malloc(length+1);
if((n = read(sockfd, buffer, length) < 0){
error("read: %m");
free(buffer);
return 1;
}
buffer[n] = '\0';
return 0;
}
提示: 5rOo5oSPc216ZW9m
#!c
char *read_username(int sockfd)
{
char *buffer, *style, userstring[1024];
int i;
buffer = (char *)malloc(1024);
if(!buffer){
error("buffer allocation failed: %m");
return NULL;
}
if(read(sockfd, userstring, sizeof(userstring)-1) <= 0){
free(buffer);
error("read failure: %m");
return NULL;
}
userstring[sizeof(userstring)-1] = '\0';
style = strchr(userstring, ':');
if(style)
*style++ = '\0';
sprintf(buffer, "username=%.32s", userstring);
if(style)
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer)-strlen(buffer)-1,
", style=%s\n", style);
return buffer;
}
提示：
#!c
/* special thing for ldap.
* The parts are separated by question marks.
* From RFC 2255:
* ldapurl = scheme "://" [hostport] ["/"
* [dn ["?" [attributes] ["?" [scope]
* ["?" [filter] ["?" extensions]]]]]]
*/
if (!strncasecmp(uri, "ldap", 4))
{
?char *token[5];
int c = 0;
token[0] = cp = ap_pstrdup(p, cp);
while (*cp && c < 5) {
if (*cp == '?') {
token[++c] = cp + 1;
*cp = '\0';
}
++cp;
}
tips
#!c
char *indx;
int count;
char nameStr[MAX_LEN]; //256
...
memset(nameStr, '\0', sizeof(nameStr));
...
indx = (char *)(pkt + rr_offset);
count = (char)*indx;
while (count){
if (strlen(nameStr) + count < ( MAX_LEN - 1) ){
(char *)indx++;
strncat(nameStr, (char *)indx, count);
indx += count;
count = (char)*indx;
strncat(nameStr, ".",
sizeof(nameStr) strlen(nameStr));
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Alert! Someone is attempting "
"to send LONG DNS packets\n");
count = 0; }
}
nameStr[strlen(nameStr)-1] = '\0';
#!c
char *indx;
int count;
char nameStr[MAX_LEN]; //256
...
memset(nameStr, '\0', sizeof(nameStr));
...
indx = (char *)(pkt + rr_offset);
count = (char)*indx;
while (count){
/* typecast the strlen so we aren't dependent on
the call to be properly setting to unsigned. */
if ((unsigned int)strlen(nameStr) +
(unsigned int)count < ( MAX_LEN - 1) ){
(char *)indx++;
strncat(nameStr, (char *)indx, count);
indx += count;
count = (char)*indx;
strncat(nameStr, ".",
sizeof(nameStr) strlen(nameStr));
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Alert! Someone is attempting "
"to send LONG DNS packets\n");
count = 0;
}
}
nameStr[strlen(nameStr)-1] = '\0';
#!c
unsigned char *indx;
unsigned int count;
unsigned char nameStr[MAX_LEN]; //256
...
memset(nameStr, '\0', sizeof(nameStr));
...
indx = (char *)(pkt + rr_offset);
count = (char)*indx;
while (count){
if (strlen(nameStr) + count < ( MAX_LEN - 1) ){
indx++;
strncat(nameStr, indx, count);
indx += count;
count = *indx;
strncat(nameStr, ".",
sizeof(nameStr) strlen(nameStr));
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Alert! Someone is attempting "
"to send LONG DNS packets\n");
count = 0;
}
}
nameStr[strlen(nameStr)-1] = '\0';
接下要在匯編代碼堆里磨練下,下面的匯編代碼有安全問題嗎？都是些什么問題？
#!bash
text:0040106B sub_40106B proc near ; CODE XREF: _main+58p
.text:0040106B
.text:0040106B var_10004 = byte ptr -10004h
.text:0040106B var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:0040106B arg_0 = word ptr 8
.text:0040106B
.text:0040106B push ebp
.text:0040106C mov ebp, esp
.text:0040106E mov eax, 10004h
.text:00401073 call __alloca_probe
.text:00401078 mov eax, dword_404020
.text:0040107D xor eax, ebp
.text:0040107F mov [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:00401082 movsx eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401086 movsx eax, [ebp+eax+var_10004]
.text:0040108E push eax
.text:0040108F push offset Format ; "t %x"
.text:00401094 call ds:printf
.text:0040109A pop ecx
.text:0040109B pop ecx
.text:0040109C mov ecx, [ebp+var_4]
.text:0040109F xor ecx, ebp
.text:004010A1 xor eax, eax
.text:004010A3 call sub_401BD2
.text:004010A8 leave
#!bash
text:004010AA sub_4010AA proc near ; CODE XREF: _main+60p
.text:004010AA
.text:004010AA var_190 = dword ptr -190h
.text:004010AA arg_0 = dword ptr 8
.text:004010AA
.text:004010AA push ebp
.text:004010AB mov ebp, esp
.text:004010AD mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:004010B0 sub esp, 190h
.text:004010B6 cmp eax, 64h
.text:004010B9 jle short loc_4010BE
.text:004010BB push 64h
.text:004010BD pop eax
.text:004010BE
.text:004010BE loc_4010BE: ; CODE XREF: sub_4010AA+Fj
.text:004010BE push [ebp+eax*4+var_190]
.text:004010C5 push offset Format ; "t %x"
.text:004010CA call ds:printf
.text:004010D0 pop ecx
#!bash
.text:00401000 sub_401000 proc near ; CODE XREF: _main+48p
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 var_190 = dword ptr -190h
.text:00401000 arg_0 = dword ptr 8
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 push ebp
.text:00401001 mov ebp, esp
.text:00401003 mov eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401006 sub esp, 190h
.text:0040100C cmp eax, 64h
.text:0040100F jbe short loc_401014
.text:00401011 push 64h
.text:00401013 pop eax
.text:00401014
.text:00401014 loc_401014: ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+Fj
.text:00401014 push [ebp+eax*4+var_190]
.text:0040101B push offset Format ; "t %x"
.text:00401020 call ds:printf
.text:00401026 pop ecx
.text:00401027 pop ecx
#!bash
.text:004010D6 sub_4010D6 proc near ; CODE XREF: _main+68p
.text:004010D6
.text:004010D6 arg_0 = dword ptr 4
.text:004010D6
.text:004010D6 push esi
.text:004010D7 push 64h ; Size
.text:004010D9 call ds:malloc
.text:004010DF mov esi, eax
.text:004010E1 mov eax, [esp+8+arg_0]
.text:004010E5 cmp eax, 64h
.text:004010E8 pop ecx
.text:004010E9 jle short loc_4010EE
.text:004010EB push 64h
.text:004010ED pop eax
.text:004010EE
.text:004010EE loc_4010EE: ; CODE XREF: sub_4010D6+13j
.text:004010EE movsx eax, byte ptr [eax+esi]
.text:004010F2 push eax
.text:004010F3 push offset Format ; "t %x"
.text:004010F8 call ds:printf
.text:004010FE push esi ; Memory
.text:004010FF call ds:free
#!bash
. text:0040110C sub_40110C proc near ; CODE XREF: _main+70p
.text:0040110C
.text:0040110C var_19A0 = byte ptr -19A0h
.text:0040110C var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:0040110C arg_0 = word ptr 8
.text:0040110C
.text:0040110C push ebp
.text:0040110D mov ebp, esp
.text:0040110F mov eax, 19A0h
.text:00401114 call __alloca_probe
.text:00401119 mov eax, dword_404020
.text:0040111E xor eax, ebp
.text:00401120 mov [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:00401123 movsx eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401127 movsx eax, [ebp+eax+var_19A0]
.text:0040112F push eax
.text:00401130 push offset Format ; "t %x"
.text:00401135 call ds:printf
.text:0040113B pop ecx
.text:0040113C pop ecx
.text:0040113D mov ecx, [ebp+var_4]
.text:00401140 xor ecx, ebp
#!bash
.text:0040102C sub_40102C proc near ; CODE XREF: _main+50p
.text:0040102C
.text:0040102C var_10004 = byte ptr -10004h
.text:0040102C var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:0040102C arg_0 = word ptr 8
.text:0040102C
.text:0040102C push ebp
.text:0040102D mov ebp, esp
.text:0040102F mov eax, 10004h
.text:00401034 call __alloca_probe
.text:00401039 mov eax, dword_404020
.text:0040103E xor eax, ebp
.text:00401040 mov [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:00401043 movzx eax, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:00401047 movsx eax, [ebp+eax+var_10004]
.text:0040104F push eax
.text:00401050 push offset Format ; "t %x"
.text:00401055 call ds:printf
.text:0040105B pop ecx
#!bash
. .text:0040118A ; int __cdecl sub_40118A(LPCSTR lpMultiByteStr)
.text:0040118A sub_40118A proc near ; CODE XREF: _main+91p
.text:0040118A
.text:0040118A WideCharStr = word ptr -44h
.text:0040118A var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:0040118A lpMultiByteStr = dword ptr 8
.text:0040118A
.text:0040118A push ebp
.text:0040118B mov ebp, esp
.text:0040118D sub esp, 44h
.text:00401190 mov eax, dword_404020
.text:00401195 xor eax, ebp
.text:00401197 mov [ebp+var_4], eax
.text:0040119A mov ecx, [ebp+lpMultiByteStr]
.text:0040119D mov eax, ecx
.text:0040119F push esi
.text:004011A0 lea esi, [eax+1]
.text:004011A3
.text:004011A3 loc_4011A3: ; CODE XREF: sub_40118A+1Ej
.text:004011A3 mov dl, [eax]
.text:004011A5 inc eax
.text:004011A6 test dl, dl
.text:004011A8 jnz short loc_4011A3
.text:004011AA push 40h ; cchWideChar
.text:004011AC lea edx, [ebp+WideCharStr]
.text:004011AF push edx ; lpWideCharStr
.text:004011B0 sub eax, esi
.text:004011B2 push eax ; cbMultiByte
.text:004011B3 push ecx ; lpMultiByteStr
.text:004011B4 push 0 ; dwFlags
.text:004011B6 push 0 ; CodePage
.text:004011B8 call ds:MultiByteToWideChar
#!bash
text:00401738 Size = dword ptr 4
.text:00401738 Src = dword ptr 8
.text:00401738
.text:00401738 push esi
.text:00401739 push edi
.text:0040173A mov edi, [esp+8+Size]
.text:0040173E lea eax, [edi+1]
.text:00401741 push eax ; Size
.text:00401742 call ds:__imp__malloc
.text:00401748 mov esi, eax
.text:0040174A test esi, esi
.text:0040174C pop ecx
.text:0040174D jz short loc_401774
.text:0040174F push edi ; Size
.text:00401750 push [esp+0Ch+Src] ; Src
.text:00401754 push esi ; Dst
.text:00401755 call _memcpy
.text:0040175A push esi
.text:0040175B push offset aS ; "%s\n"
.text:00401760 mov byte ptr [esi+edi], 0
.text:00401764 call ds:__imp__printf
匯編代碼層面的例子需要想想它們的源代碼都是怎么寫的才能編譯出來這些有安全漏洞的代碼。做到源代碼層面和匯編代碼層面通吃。更要做到從宏觀上了解程序世界功能和規則，從微觀上了解其實現細節。
上面的例子都不到一百行的匯編代碼，都找出問題了嗎？決戰匯編代碼就是需要我們在真實程序世界的上千萬行匯編代碼中找出那些隱藏的安全漏洞，這個難度會高很多。其中有對抗有編程者的防御措施，需要思考如何打敗它，是和程序世界的締造者們的一次跨時間和空間無聲的較量。
以上這些其實是一個引子，需要小伙伴繼續深入研究推演和鍛煉。推薦學習Mark Down & JohnMcDonald兩位大牛的書《The Art of Software Security Assessment-- Identifying andavoiding software vulnerabilities》（某些例子來自該書），希望對小伙伴們有所幫助。
97av